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Abstract—We present a solution for preventing guests in a
virtualized system from using direct memory access (DMA) to
access memory regions of other guests. The principles we suggest,
and that we also have implemented, are purely based on software
and standard hardware. No additional virtualization hardware
such as an I/O Memory Management Unit (IOMMU) is needed.
Instead, the protection of the DMA controller is realized with
means of a common ARM MMU only. Overhead occurs only in
pre- and postprocessing of DMA transfers and is limited to a few
microseconds. The solution was designed with focus on security
and the abstract concept of the approach was formally verified.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Different types of embedded systems are present in all
kinds of computing and control devices ranging from low
power sensor nodes to mobile phones. Not only the usage
of embedded systems is increasing, also the number of their
vulnerabilities is. The trend towards the usage of common
software components, highly interconnected systems and open
architectures increases the risk of software attacks even more,
evoking the need for more powerful protection mechanisms.
A promising approach is the usage of virtualization as mean
to isolate security-critical from non-security-critical execution,
for example a commodity operating system from trusted
services. Such a separation can be achieved independently
from the complexity of the guest systems. In fact, the trusted
computing base can be reduced by the introduction of a
virtualization layer. The smaller the trusted computing base
is, the earlier it is possible to get assurance on the security
achieved, for example through formal verification. The idea
of using virtualization as an enabler for security is not new;
however, there is still a deficit of solutions targeting the
special needs of embedded systems while keeping a small
code base. In [1] we presented such an approach. It targets
the widespread ARMv5 platforms and focuses on security
by providing isolation between guests. With a footprint of
less than 10 KB the described hypervisor is reasonable thin.
Furthermore, the performance overhead has been shown to be
low, even though ARMv5 does not provide any advanced hard-
ware support for virtualization. This shortcoming is expected
to change in the future and the recent ARMv7 Cortex-A15
has additional hardware support to handle virtual to physical
address translation [2]. Their System MMU [3] even targets
Direct Memory Access (DMA) in particular. However, legacy
embedded systems will exist for a very long time and currently
there is still a lack of essential hardware functions such as
assisted handling of peripheral units by an IOMMU [4].
To provide peripheral devices with quick access to the
memory, DMA became essential even in embedded systems.
DMA controllers are able to copy data faster than the CPU.
However, most of the related work that aims at virtualization
of DMA does not (or not sufficiently) take care of security
matters in respect to DMA. The purpose of our paper is
thus to address this issue. That is indeed needed as DMA
potentially opens an alternative way for attackers to modify
otherwise inaccessible memory by bypassing CPU and MMU.
We show how to extend the previous hypervisor design by
adding protection against such attacks. Common solutions
use to address this challenge by the usage of an IOMMU.
However, many embedded systems lack this hardware feature.
We therefore show how to prevent DMA attacks with high
secure isolation guarantees through DMA virtualization
based on standard ARM Memory Management Unit (MMU)
functionality only. Our design approach is generic and
applies to newer ARM architectures such as ARMv6 and
ARMv7 as well. Embedded platforms without hardware
virtualization support like ARMv5 will remain widespread for
many years. Especially low end devices still use early designs.
The following contributions are made in the paper:
• We describe how virtualization can be used to protect
DMA on ARMv5 based systems.
• We show that secure DMA virtualization is feasible
without additional hardware.
• We make a careful security and performance analysis of
our design proposal.
• We provide a formal proof of the abstract concept of the
approach.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: First,
we give an overview of related work. Next, assumptions,
the threat model and security requirements are defined. After
an introduction to the ARM architecture and the hypervisor,
the DMA virtualization approach is explained in detail. An
analysis of the results and a discussion of the concept’s formal
verification subsequently underline the value of the approach.
Finally, we conclude the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Virtualization as mean to provide security in embedded
systems was discussed in [5]. Previous attempts to actual use
virtualization on embedded systems have mostly been focused
on porting of widely used virtualization layers such as Xen [6],
[7] or on performance analysis aspects [8].
That strong isolation can be achieved through advanced
combination of virtualization and the standard memory pro-
tection support on for example Intel based systems was
convincingly showed in the recent works by Seshadri et al
in [9] and [10]. Our design allows even the support of DMA
without loss of isolation or the need for advanced I/O memory
protection (such as an IOMMU). Ha¨rtig et al. [11] describe
how to monitor potentially malicious device drivers of a
system without a hardware IOMMU. However, different from
our approach, their work is neither designed to support several
guests nor does it cover scheduling or virtual views on the
DMA controller. Furthermore we put the assurance of security
properties into the focus.
Recent work has shown that verification of low level soft-
ware is in fact feasible. Klein et al. successfully verified the
micro kernel seL4 [12] and the Robin project [13] made
progress on the verification of the Nova hypervisor [14].
This gives us motivation to perform verification effort on our
solutions (such as the here described approach) as well.
III. PREREQUISITES
A. Assumptions
The following assumptions are made in this paper:
• The only DMA controller present on the platform is a
general purpose DMAC not bounded to any particular
peripheral. It does not perform any action without being
programmed to do so by the CPU. The programming
interface of the DMAC is known to the hypervisor.
• The MMU supports the management of ARM domains
(see Sect. IV-B). Peripherals are memory mapped and
access to them can be controlled through the MMU.
• All hardware entities, including the DMAC and the
MMU, are working correctly and are not malicious. No
physical attacks or tampering attempts are present.
• The hypervisor code is loaded unmodified at system
startup. All upstream entities (such as the BIOS and the
boot loader) are trusted. To ensure this, a secure boot
process [15] can be used.
B. Threat Model
The attacker is assumed to have complete control over one
or several guests. That includes the possibility to execute
arbitrary code and to access data with its/their rights. The
attacker’s goal is to compromise any other guest, that is, to
modify or read its code or data, or to prevent, delay or control
execution of foreign code. We assume that he or she has no
intention to determine whether DMA is used by other parties
or not. However, should a stricter security property be desired,
the hypervisor could be extended in one of the following ways
to prevent revealing delays:
• “Secret” DMA tasks can be stopped in favor of DMA
tasks issued by a guest which might possibly be interested
in observing the DMA activities of the system. They can
be resend to the DMAC after other tasks are done.
• The hypervisor can introduce pseudo delays if the DMAC
is not used by other guests, so that an attacker cannot
distinguish between free and occupied DMAC channels.
• The concurrent execution of guests can be (temporarily)
disallowed or the hypervisor can wait until all “secret”
DMA tasks are finished before a potentially malicious
guest is called.
All those measures can be provided optionally so that they
only apply for certain critical guest configurations.
C. Security Requirements
The goal is to provide isolation between guests to prevent
any of the attacks described in the threat model. Furthermore it
shall be guaranteed that DMA functionality is always available
to non-malicious guests. This means that any policy-conform
DMA task will eventually be processed. Given those targets,
the following security requirements need to be implemented:
1) Every attempt to access the DMA controller leads to a
trap into the hypervisor.
2) The DMAC performs only those copy operations which
comply with the access policy. A word is accessible ac-
cording to that policy if and only if it can be written/read
by the current guest even without DMA support, that is,
via the CPU, but in context of the valid MMU settings.
3) No guest can (re-)program a DMA request on behalf
of another guest. This is independent from the access
policy. Assume guest 1 has access to the addresses
A,B,C,D and intents a copying from A to B, then
guest 2 is not able to alter this request to, e.g. “from C
to D”, even though this would be a valid request when
issued by guest 1 without interference of guest 2.
4) The scheduling does not influence the security.
5) Virtualization solutions which are supposed to provide
security may have the vulnerability that they are at-
tackable in their configuration [16]. In contrast, our
hypervisor can not be modified by guests, neither using
DMA functionality nor otherwise.
6) All DMA tasks that comply with the policy are either
directly processed by the DMAC or enqueued.
7) Every DMA request will be processed (either executed
or denied) and subsequently deleted from the DMAC
and internal structures, so that they can not get blocked.
The isolation target is covered by requirements 1 - 5. DMA
functionality can only be used through the hypervisor (1),
which itself is not modifiable (5) and works correctly. Working
correctly here means that it only grants valid accesses (2)
issued by the right guest (3) and that itself will not modify
accesses so that they would influence security (4). Availability
follows directly from requirements 6 and 7.
IV. ARCHITECTURE AND HYPERVISOR
A. Operation Modes
ARMv5 has one non-privileged mode and six privileged
modes without further hierarchy. As a hypervisor needs to
supervise guest kernels, it has to operate in the privileged
ring while all guests have to be placed completely into the
non-privileged mode. On interrupts and data aborts, the CPU
switches to the privileged ring. By using a software interrupt,
guests can intentionally pass control to the hypervisor.
B. Memory Access Control
The MMU is used to ensure separation between guests and
to protect the hypervisor. The ARM architecture allows to
define so called “domains”. Each page can be assigned to
one of them. Depending on the access bits for a domain,
all its pages are either not accessible at all, fully accessible
or subject to the settings on page table level. This allows
the simultaneous changing of memory access rights for all
domains by only one register access. Input and output devices
are memory mapped and are thus also subject to the MMU
based access control. This enables a hypervisor to intercept on
interaction with the DMAC via an according abort handler.
C. OVP and the DMA Controller
We have developed a proof of concept implementation,
which has been tested on an emulated platform by Open
Virtual Platforms (OVP) [17]. Our implementation utilizes
the general purpose DMAC provided by OVP. Different from
the ARM provided PrimeCell DMA Controller (PL080) [18],
the OVP DMAC has only two channels instead of eight
and is restricted to the simplest functionality. However, the
programming interface is similar and the simplified DMAC is
still sufficient to demonstrate the effectiveness of the approach
described in this paper. The focus lies on four channel specific
registers, namely a source and a destination register, the
control register, in which information about the burst size and
the total size of the data is encoded, and the configuration
register, which causes the copying to start on certain values.
D. The Hypervisor
The starting point for our design was a hypervisor previ-
ously designed and implemented by the Swedish Institute of
Computer Science. The hypervisor aims at the isolation of
guests. Each guest is made up of an arbitrary number of guest
modes. Besides separating different guests from each other,
the hypervisor can also strengthen isolation between the guest
modes of one single guest (such as the user and the kernel
mode of an operating system). In either case the hypervisor
can be configured to allow inter-mode-access mono- or bi-
directional or to prohibit it so that isolation is guaranteed.
A typical scenario would include a setup of one commodity
operating system along with a domain (guest mode) for
trusted services. Several memory regions can be defined, for
example one for each guest mode, and pages can be assigned
accordingly to determined ARM memory domains, which
allow quick locking and unlocking of the guests’ data and
executable code. Additionally, when switching between two
guest modes, the hypervisor saves and restores the respective
contexts, that is, the registers’ contents. For the communication
between guest modes the hypervisor offers the possibility
of establishing remote procedure calls (RPC). The operating
system FreeRTOS was successfully ported to the hypervisor.
V. DMA VIRTUALIZATION
Common to other hardware virtualization solutions, we
use an approach where we emulate the DMAC. Different
from typical approaches though, our design is driven by a
careful security analysis, making sure that a hostile guest
will not be able to circumvent any system access rules.
This includes interrupt handling and memory access control.
Guests do not interact directly with the physical controller.
Instead, each access attempt will result in trapping into the
hypervisor, which then controls and manages the DMA tasks
before forwarding them to the physical DMA controller. Thus,
programming a DMA task appears to the guest as if there were
no virtualization. In the background the hypervisor checks
access conditions and takes care of scheduling issues. When
the DMA task is done, the hypervisor forwards the interrupt
it has received from the DMAC to the guest in charge.
A. Shadow Copies and Scheduling
To prevent guests from interfering during foreign DMAC
setups, the hypervisor maintains shadow copies of the DMAC
(one for each guest mode). When a guest tries to access
a certain register of the physical DMAC, the hypervisor is
invoked via the data abort handler and writes the given value
into the guest mode’s shadow DMAC instead. The physical
DMAC will only receive complete and bundled data from
the hypervisor. There might exist more guests concurrently
interested in DMA than resources are available. As guests may
assume that they are possessing the hardware for their own use,
they will not actively wait with submitting DMA requests until
the DMAC is not longer occupied. Instead, they will post their
request assuming that it is processed. Thus, the hypervisor
keeps track on which guests have commanded a DMA task and
memorizes the parameters as long as the task is not sent to the
real DMAC (when occupied). The decision to manage shadow
DMACs makes the memorization of parameters simple. A
queue is used to schedule the DMA tasks. As we assume a
symmetric system, tasks can be assigned to any free channel
of the physical DMAC, regardless of whether the physical
and the virtual channel numbers are equivalent. Depending on
whether a DMA task is enqueued or posted to the physical
DMAC, the according virtual channel in the guests’s shadow
DMAC will be marked as waiting or active, respectively.
B. Trapping with the Data Abort Handler
After trapping to the privileged ring, the data abort handler
of the hypervisor determines from where an access attempt
came and to which address it was directed. To get to know
whether it was a reading or writing access and which CPU
register was supposed to be involved, the hypervisor decodes
the machine instruction. If the instruction refers to the DMAC,
the hypervisor will calculate which channel and which register
was meant and as long as the (virtual) channel is not marked
busy the value to be written will be filled in into the shadow
register. In case of an correctly formatted access to the
configuration register, the DMA task in question is checked
with respect to the access policy.
C. Access Control
The DMA access policy is directly derived from the sys-
tem’s access definitions. Whether or not a guest is allowed to
read or write from or to a certain spot in memory is already
defined in the MMU coprocessor registers and the access
control data structures of the hypervisor. The same rules will
apply for copying operations with the use of DMA.
D. Handling DMA Interrupts
The purpose of DMA interrupts is to inform the issuer of a
DMA task that the operation is done. In our scenario the hy-
pervisor will receive those interrupts. Besides forwarding them
to the corresponding guest mode by calling a special handler
provided by the guest, the hypervisor also uses the interrupts
to determine when the DMAC is available again. Summarized,
the hypervisor safes the execution context of involved guest
modes, disables further interrupts and switches to the interrupt
handling mode. After finishing its procedure, the just called
guest yields back to the hypervisor by a hypercall. Finally, the
hypervisor re-enables interrupts, dequeues waiting DMA tasks
and returns to the interrupted guest mode.
VI. EVALUATION
A. Performance
With the help of the emulator by OVP we compared
the performance of the described virtualization solution with
DMA support to:
1) the performance of DMA in a non-virtualized (not
protected) system and
2) the performance of copying without DMA.
Especially the latter underlines the value of our work. The
usage of an emulator allows us to make a very detailed per-
formance analysis based on the granularity of cycle numbers.
Table I gives an overview on how many cycles the setup
of the DMAC, the programming of a task and the handling
of a DMA interrupt take in the standard and the secured
virtualized version, respectively. The DMA programming step
is detailed analyzed in respect to its substeps: trapping into
the hypervisor, obtaining the shadow copy (SC) of the guest
mode, filling out the shadow copy, performing the access
control check, submitting the task to the real controller and
the possible need to enqueue a task. The number of required
cycles of different requests can vary slightly, depending on the
channel addressed (due to address calculation), the number
of channels used, the access policy etc. Therefore, both the
minimum and the maximum values of our tests are listed. The
upper bounds for setup, programing and interrupt handling,
respectively, are compared to the performance values of the
non-virtualized reference system. The resulting factors are
listed in the fourth column. Our reference processor, the
ARM926EJ-S, performs at least 200 million instructions per
second (MIPS) so that the required time for the single steps can
be approximated (in micro seconds). Even though the factors
seem to be quite high at first glance, the security effort is
nonetheless reasonable for a solution that does not require any
hardware changes to the legacy system at all: a whole DMA
cycle (programming a task and handling the interrupt) will not
take more than 15 micro seconds. This low overhead in the
pre- and postprocessing is negligible compared to the benefits
of using DMA (for details see below).
TABLE I
OVERHEAD OF SECURING THROUGH VIRTUALIZATION
step standard virtualized × µsec
setup of DMAC 51 51 1 0.26
programming
.. trapping 466
.. obtaining SC 135 - 178
.. filling out SC 233 - 272
.. access control 462
.. submission 44 380 - 458
.. (enqueuing) (57)
= total 44 1676 - 1836 42 9.18
interrupt handling 89 1155 13 5.78
total per task 133 2831 - 2991 23 14.96
Besides comparing non-secured and secured DMA with
each other, we also have analyzed when the performance
benefits of secure DMA exceed its costs. More specificly,
we have measured the CPU cycles required to copy different
amounts of data without DMA, that is, only with the CPU
running copying instructions in a loop. Figure 1 displays those
results (“CPU”) and compares them to the constant costs
of using DMA (“DMA”). Copying a single word (4 bytes)
without DMA requires 21 to 25 cycles on average, depending
on the data structure and loop overheads. While for small tasks
the use of DMA is not appropriate, from around 128 words
(0.5 KB) on it consumes less CPU cycles than the standard
way. Note that both variants are secured by the hypervisor.
Finally, the graph labeled “DMA/CPU” shows the ratio of the
costs when copying with DMA and CPU only, respectively.
It is clearly visible that the use of DMA quickly becomes
strongly preferable, even without loss of security.
B. Security Analysis
Referring back to the security requirements defined in
Sect. III-C, we now go through them step by step (original
numbering kept) and reason why our solution fulfills them.
1) The memory region in which the DMAC is situated is
configured to deny any access from the unprivileged
processor mode in which all guest code is executed.
Every access attempt invokes the data abort handler
defined by the hypervisor.
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Fig. 1. Comparison between DMA and CPU copying of words in a secured
environment
2) The hypervisor is the only entity which is able to
program the DMAC. Before filling out its registers, the
DMA task in question is checked according to the same
criteria which apply to writing and reading processes
without DMA support. Should this test fail, the task
will neither be submitted nor enqueued. Once a task
is actually submitted or enqueued, it cannot be modified
anymore.
3) All programming steps are performed on a guest specific
shadow DMAC first. That is, no guest can interrupt
another one and modify specifications such as source
and destination address in the name of the interrupted
guest. This protection ensures that interferences during
the programming of the DMAC are not possible. Only
the very last step, the actual commitment, causes the
physical DMAC to be filled out. This is done by the
hypervisor on the basis of the shadow DMAC of the
current guest. With other words, no data from other
guests can influence this process. Interrupts are disabled
during this last step.
4) The queuing operations do not modify the actual content
of DMA tasks. Only the physical channel chosen can
differ from the virtual channel number, which does
neither affect which data is copied nor to which address.
Furthermore, the hypervisor keeps track from which
guest a certain DMA task came so that interrupts are
forwarded to the actual issuer of a DMA request.
5) The memory region in which the hypervisor is situated
is configured to deny any access from the unprivileged
processor mode, in which all guest code is executed.
Therefore, the protection of the hypervisor itself follows
from observation 2.
6) The number of bytes to copy and the source and des-
tination address of a DMA request communicated by
the guest are saved without modifications in the shadow
structure of the guest mode. As each guest mode has an
own shadow copy, no interference between guests can
occur. The request procedure is completed by a write
attempt to the configuration register. This will invoke
the access policy check. In case of acceptance, the task
is submitted to the DMAC or, if this is occupied, will
be enqueued. The queue can not overflow as the number
of DMA tasks marked waiting is limited by the number
of guest modes times the number of DMA channels.
This follows from the fact that each channel can only
be programmed once at a time per guest mode.
7) First, the characteristics of a queue ensures that each
task enqueued will be processed at some time. Invalid
requests will not even be enqueued. Tasks are finite and
after their completion the DMAC will fire an interrupt,
which will reach the hypervisor. The latter will delete
the task from the DMAC and its internal structures. If
an interrupt occurs while another one is processed, the
hypervisor will notice the second task completion as
well as it (re-)checks the states of all DMAC channels
immediately before leaving the interrupt service routine
again. However, denial of service attacks can be a threat
to the complete handling of DMA interrupts. How they
can be prevented or at least limited is described below.
The possibility that a guest does not yield back to the
hypervisor is always given, not only in the context of DMA
support. A good way to get control back in any case is the
use of a timer tick counter or watchdog interrupt, which will
call a hypervisor function after a predefined amount of time.
Especially for the DMA interrupt handling presented here
there are additional means by extending the configuration of
the hypervisor. For example, the hypervisor can be changed
to disallow or postpone the interrupting of guest modes which
are seen as especially important and protect worthy. That
way, a malicious guest mode cannot use a DMA task to
get execution time (via its DMA interrupt handler) during a
sensitive operation of another guest mode. Vice versa, it is
conceivable to grant only trusted guests the possibility of own
DMA interrupt handlers, at least in critical situations. But not
only the DMA interrupts need to be considered. Each attempt
to program the DMAC, no matter if successful or not, causes
a delay in the system. To prevent malicious guests to use this
for slowing the system down, the hypervisor can easily be
modified to restrict accesses to a certain number or frequency
per guest mode.
VII. FORMAL VERIFICATION OF A
SIMPLIFIED DMA MODEL
One of the benefits of using virtualization for security is the
relatively small size of a special purpose hypervisor compared
to a complex modern operating system. This reduces the
trusted computing base distinctly and allows formal verifica-
tion of the system’s overall security properties. We used the
Coq theorem prover [19] to show memory isolation in the
context of DMA on a highly simplified model.
Assuming there are exactly two guests, either of them
potentially malicious. Guest 2 is the “object of comparison”: it
is shown that the memory region and data structures assigned
to guest 2 are not influenced by DMA operations of guest 1. It
follows that both the integrity of guest 2 and the confidentiality
of guest 1 hold.1 We model the machine state as a record
of a simplified memory, the DMAC and its two shadow
copies, flags indicating which guest system has DMA transfers
active, resp. waiting, and finally an interrupt flag indicating
the completion of a DMA transfer. We assume that a guest
system can read the memory addresses belonging to it at
any time. In contrast, the MMU prevents accesses (not using
DMA) to the other guest’s memory. An execution consists of a
sequence of state transformations. Three state transformations
are represented in the model, namely the activities of the
hypervisor initialized whenever a guest attempts to access
the DMAC, the operations performed by the DMAC and the
functionality of the interrupt handler. As those transformations
usually occur together, we summarize such a chain to an
execution block, denoted by F . Depending whether it was
evoked by guest 1 or 2, it is referred to by F1 or F2,
respectively. Following those conventions the execution of the
system can be seen as a sequence of blocks, as for example
F1 − F2 − F1 − F2 − F2 − F2 − F1 − . . .. We show that, in
this model, under no circumstances the content of the memory
region for guest 2 will depend on the inputs made by guest
1. With other words no information can flow from guest 1
to guest 2. This is done by proving that for any execution
sequence, neither the memory content belonging to guest 2 nor
the content of guest 2’s shadow DMAC registers change when
eliminating blocks of type F1. The proof uses an important
state invariant, reflecting that the state is correctly and soundly
configured, defined as follows:
• The DMAC is set up according to the access policy.
• If some shadow DMAC is marked enabled, its source and
destination registers follow the access policy.
• No guest is active and waiting at the same time.
• The interrupt flag is only set if the DMAC is enabled.
• The physical DMAC is enabled if and only if at least one
of the shadow DMAC is.
• A shadow DMAC is marked enabled if and only if the
corresponding guest is marked as active or waiting.
• If some guest is marked as waiting then the other guest
is marked as active.
It is shown that all hardware and hypervisor operations main-
tain this invariant, that is, when starting in a correct and
soundly configured state, the execution will result in another
correct and soundly configured state. Finally the main theorem
is formulated as follows: Starting in a correct and sound con-
figured initial state and building up two execution sequences
of which one represents any actual execution and the other is
the related sequence ignoring all operation/execution blocks
caused by guest 1, then at every step both sequences will
be equivalent with respect to guest 2. We were successful in
proving the theorem in Coq using 2200 lines of proof, out of
which 300 describe the actual model. Even though this initial
verification effort demonstrates that the DMA approach of the
paper is based on sound fundamentals, it still relies on strong
assumptions and a very simplified model. Work on refining
1Confidentiality of guest 1 and integrity of guest 2 hold by symmetry.
the approach is in progress.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
We have demonstrated that DMA virtualization only based
on software and standard hardware can provide high security
guarantees. To strengthen this even more we also have applied
formal verification. Besides isolation, availability is warranted.
Moreover, our approach has a low performance overhead, on
the order of a few microseconds in pre- and postprocessing of
DMA transfers. We intend to compare our performance results
to systems with ARMv7 and/or System MMU. Additional
features such as broader platform support or secure booting
are also left for future work. As for verification, we plan to
analyze the whole hypervisor on binary level.
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